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NOTE
A THIRD WAY: THE PRESIDENTIAL
NONSIGNING STATEMENT
Ross A. Wilsont
This Note proposes an alternative approach for a president who wishes
to register constitutional concerns about an enrolled bill without vetoing it.
Recently, presidents have done so by issuing statements upon signing such
bills that purport to "construe" them for consistency with the Constitution.
This practice has fueled an intense controversy among commentators, many
of whom contend that such signing statements are themselves unconstitu-
tional. However, the recent commentary largely assumes that the President
has only the options of signature or veto upon presentment, ignoring the
Constitution's provision for a bill to become law without the President's sig-
nature-what this Note terms a default enactment.
This Note submits that the President should consider allowing a default
enactment when confronting doubts about the constitutionality of minor,
noncentral provisions of a bill. In such cases, the President may issue a
nonsigning statement in lieu of the more controversial signing statement.
The Note lays out factors to assist the President's determination of whether to
allow a constitutionally doubtful bill to become law; it also explains how a
nonsigning statement differs from a signing statement.
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INTRODUCTION
In the final hours of 2005, President George W. Bush issued a
written statement that appeared to undermine key provisions of a law
banning torture that he had just signed.' Soon thereafter, the popu-
1 See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,
2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918-19 (Dec. 30, 2005) (announcing that "[t]he exec-
utive branch shall construe" an enacted ban on "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment" for detainees in U.S. custody, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd, "in a manner consistent
with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch
and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judi-
cial power . . .").
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lar media2 and the legal academy3 seized upon the legality of using
such "signing statements" to constitutionally challenge or interpret
enacted laws.
A robust discourse ensued, revealing diverse understandings of
the President's constitutional power to disregard congressionally en-
rolled laws,4 influence legislative history,5 and determine an adminis-
trative agency's interpretation of laws. 6 Likewise, commentators also
diverged on the duty that the President's oath to defend the Constitu-
tion might impose when Congress presents a bill that he believes is
unconstitutional.7 Moreover, some questioned whether signing state-
ments themselves even implicated any of these problems.8
This Note does not attempt to resolve the constitutional contro-
versies described above but instead seeks to show two things: (1) that
these controversies reveal some consensus principles that the Presi-
dent should consider when determining whether the Article II oath
requires the President to veto a given bill, and (2) that one important
option for the President to consider upon presentment has been over-
looked-allowing the bill to become law unsigned and issuing a non-
signing statement.
While the commentary on this subject generally assumes that a
president who has constitutional concerns about a presented bill has
only the options of issuing a signing statement or vetoing the bill, the
nonsigning statement is an important third option for a president to
consider. Indeed, it differs materially from both of the other options
and may be particularly appropriate in a situation that the modern
president often faces: where the President is uncertain about the con-
stitutionality of minor provisions of a large omnibus bill but believes
that such potential defects are insufficient to warrant a veto.
Presidents have, though rarely, issued nonsigning statements
before-and at least on three occasions have done so on constitu-
tional grounds. 9 The President's option to allow a bill to become law
without his signature is specifically authorized in the Constitution's
2 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, Bos. SUNDAY GLOBE, Apr.
30, 2006, at Al.
3 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Execu-
tive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:
Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1559 (2007); Symposium, The
Last Word? The Constitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements, 16 Wm. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 1 (2007); Steven G. Calabresi & Daniel Lev, The Legal Significance of Presidential
Signing Statements, FORUM (2006), http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol4/iss2/art8.
4 See discussion infra Parts I.B.1-2, I.C.
5 See discussion infra Part I.B.3.a.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 89-103.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
9 See discussion infra Part W.A.
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Presentment Clause'o and is the converse of what has been dubbed
the "pocket veto."" This Note refers to a bill's enactment without a
president's signature as a default enactment and an accompanying state-
ment explaining his reasons for not signing as a nonsigning statement.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background on signing state-
ments and the controversy surrounding their use. Part II derives
some basic consensus principles on the use of signing statements and
criteria for when a president must veto a bill. Part III analyzes a mis-
leading dictum in INS v. Chadha12 in order to clarify the role of the
default enactment in the procedure for enacting laws. Part IV
presents a third option for a president who has doubts about a bill's
constitutionality, an option that rests in between the veto and the sign-
ing statement-the nonsigning statement.
I
BACKGROUND ON SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THEIR
CONTROVERSIAL USE
A. The Enactment Procedure: "Single, Finely Wrought and
Exhaustively Considered"
The Constitution does not mention signing statements. Article I,
Section Seven of the Constitution governs the enactment of laws, pro-
viding, in part:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the Presi-
dent of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall
have originated ... 13
This section goes on to provide that, in the case of a "return"-com-
monly called a "veto"I4-Congress may reconsider the bill and enact it
without the President's signature by passing it with a two-thirds vote in
each chamber. 15 This is commonly known as a "veto override."' 6 If
the President does not sign the bill or return it within ten days, the
1o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
I1 See Kennedy v. Sampson, 364 F. Supp. 1075, 1086-87 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that
where a congressional adjournment "did not prevent the return of the bill[,] . .. the
pocket veto was invalid and [the bill] became a law without the signature of the President")
(emphasis omitted), aff'd, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
13 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
14 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 925 n.2 (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1403 (5th ed. 1979))
("In constitutional terms, 'veto' is used to describe the President's power under Art. I, § 7,
of the Constitution.").
15 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
16 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 994 n.11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
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bill's disposition depends on whether "the Congress by their Adjourn-
ment prevent its Return."17 If Congress does prevent the bill's return
by adjourning, then the bill does not become law."' This disposition
is commonly known as a "pocket veto."' 9 If a congressional adjourn-
ment does not prevent such a return, then the bill becomes law.20 This
final disposition is what this Note terms a default enactment.
Decisions from the United States Supreme Court have stressed
that the Constitution does not permit modifications to the enactment
process-neither to increase the power of Congress nor that of the
President. In INS v. Chadha, the Court held that the Constitution re-
quires bicameral passage and presentment to the President for any
bill to become law, striking down an attempt by Congress to reverse an
Executive Branch decision by "legislative veto." 21 In particular, the
Court held that when Congress by law grants a power to the President,
it cannot alone rescind that power, even if the law that provided the
power allowed for such a rescission. 22 In a rhetorical flourish, the
Court characterized the constitutionally prescribed enactment process
as "a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."23
In Clinton v. City of New York, the Court likewise struck down an
attempt to give the President a kind of "line-item veto" over certain
spending provisions in bills that he signed.24 The Court held that
Congress could not give the President authorization in advance to nul-
lify provisions of enacted laws upon signing. 25 One problem with the
line-item veto that the Court identified was the fact that it came after
the bill became law, essentially repealing a portion of an enacted law
without Congress's approval.26 In contrast, the constitutionally pre-
scribed "return" (i.e., veto) comes before enactment.27 The Court
also cited, without qualification, a letter from George Washington in
which he suggested that a president should "approve all the parts of a
Bill, or reject it in toto."28 Appending the word "either" before the
quotation, the Court implied that the disjunction was exclusive, offer-
ing it as support for the proposition that the President cannot nullify
17 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
18 Id.
19 See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676 (1929).
20 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
21 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
22 See id. at 958-59 (majority opinion).
23 Id. at 951. However, as discussed in Part III infra, this misleading phrase is not the
case's holding.
24 524 U.S. 417, 420-21 (1998).
25 See id.
26 Id. at 439.
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
28 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440 (quoting 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)).
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individual provisions of a law while approving the rest.2 9 However, as
Part III of this Note explains, the Court should be understood here as
emphasizing that the President's signature necessarily approves the
entire bill, not as holding that the President's only other option upon
presentment is a veto.3 0
Note also that the President's power to return a bill to Congress is
only a qualified veto. Unlike the absolute veto that English kings once
possessed,3 1 the President's veto power is subject to congressional
override and requires that the President send "[o]bjections" to Con-
gress along with the returned bill.32
B. Presidents' Use of Signing Statements
The use of signing statements and the attendant controversy33 are
not new. President James Monroe issued the first signing statements
interpreting enacted laws.3 4 Later, Presidents Andrew Jackson and
John Tyler issued signing statements for which they each received
sharp congressional criticism.3 5 Indeed, an 1842 House report con-
demned Tyler's signing statement as unconstitutional, "a defacement
of the public records and archives," "injurious to the public interest,"
and an "evil example for the future."3 6
1. Refusal to Comply with Enacted Laws
There are several purposes for which a president might employ a
signing statement. First, a president might issue a signing statement
to announce an intent to disregard or declare as null provisions in
bills because they are patently unconstitutional. The explicit use of a
29 See id.
30 Unfortunately, the Court stumbled again by wrongly assuming that "[t]he Constitu-
tion explicitly requires that .. . three steps be taken before a bill may 'become a law'"-
approval by the House, Senate, and the President. Id. at 448 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 7). Of course, the President's approval of a bill is not required when it becomes law by
either default enactment or veto override. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20; infra
Part III.A.
31 See CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" LAws: RE-
VIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 7-8 (1998) (noting that Parliament ousted King James II
for abusing his absolute veto).
32 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
33 Of course, presidents have often used signing statements in noncontroversial ways
as well. For example, the statements often praise the passage of a bill the President has
signed and comment on its importance. See The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing
Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C 131, 131 n.1 (1993) [hereinafter Dellinger Signing Memo]
(memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger). This Note focuses on
their controversial use as a tool to construe or ignore an enacted law.
34 Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing State-
ment 57 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University), http://www.ohiolink.
edu/etd/view.cgi?miami1057716977.
35 See id. at 57-59.
36 H.R. REP. No. 27-909, at 2, 11-12 (1842).
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signing statement for this purpose is rare, perhaps because it is the
most controversial. When President Richard Nixon objected to a stat-
ute on (nonconstitutional) policy grounds and issued a signing state-
ment apparently announcing his noncompliance,37 a court held that
Nixon could not ignore the law (but also that he was not in fact out of
compliance).3 Indeed, the question of the existence and extent of
the President's power to decline to enforce duly enacted laws has gen-
erated its own literature independent of the controversy on signing
statements. 39 As a result, presidents typically announce that they will
"construe" or "interpret" a provision in a manner consistent with their
understanding of the Constitution rather than explicitly declaring it
null.40
2. Confronting Doubts About the Constitutionality of Certain
Provisions
A president might also use a signing statement to flag possible
constitutional problems with a bill he has just signed and announce
his intended corrective action (aside from flatly ignoring it).
One common approach in this vein is to construe ambiguous lan-
guage for consistency with the Constitution.41 With this approach-
sometimes analogized to the judicial avoidance canon 42-the Presi-
dent identifies a provision as constitutionally problematic under a cer-
tain construction but reasonably susceptible to another construction
that would "save" it from violating the Constitution, which the Presi-
dent then announces that he will adopt. Thus, a president may seek
both to uphold the oath to defend the Constitution and to fulfill the
duty to faithfully execute the law.
While a president may employ this technique in good faith, it is
also susceptible to abuse. For example, President George W. Bush's
signing statements often appeared to strain to "construe" provisions
37 Statement on Signing the Military Appropriations Authorization Bill, 1971 PUB. PA-
PERS 1114 (Nov. 17, 1971).
38 DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
39 See, e.g., MAY, supra note 31; Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconsti-
tutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199 (1994) [hereinafter Dellinger Execution Memo]
(memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presi-
dential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7
(2000).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
41 See Dellinger Signing Memo, supra note 33, at 132; Dellinger Execution Memo,
supra note 39, at 200.
42 See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006); Michael T. Crabb, Comment, "The Executive Branch Shall Con-
strue": The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the Presidential Signing Statement, 56 U. KAN.
L. REV. 711 (2008).
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against their plain and unambiguous meaning.43 These signing state-
ments typically took the form of boilerplate "unitary executive" sign-
ing statements, describing what the bill "purports" to do, but then
explaining that the President would not give it effect to the extent that
it conflicted with his theory of the unitary executive.4 4 Usually such
statements provided no further information on what that construction
would mean in practice or the legal authority for doing so.45 Indeed,
President Bush sometimes invoked the avoidance canon on issues
where judicial precedent showed no conflict to avoid. 46 Although
President Obama had criticized Bush for issuing such statements,47
Obama himself recently issued a controversial signing statement in
which he declared his intent to "construe" away a limitation on his
ability to employ senior policy advisors, citing his "Presidential prerog-
atives" to "supervise and oversee the executive branch." 48
A close cousin of the "avoidance" signing statement is one in
which the President acknowledges possible future unconstitutional ap-
plications.49 With this statement, the President contends that the pro-
vision does not violate the Constitution under presently existing facts
but that it may if new facts arise. In other words, it expresses uncer-
tainty about how the questionable provision might later be applied
but declines to brand it as facially unconstitutional. This signing state-
ment, then, declares that the President will not give effect to a poten-
tial unconstitutional application. President Obama has used this
approach in at least one of his signing statements,50 and even then,
43 See DavidJ. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -
A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REv. 941, 1097 (2008) ("[Imn scores of signing state-
ments, President Bush has invoked his power as Commander in Chief in objecting to statu-
tory enactments, stating or suggesting that he will not fully comply with them (or will
construe them contrary to their natural readings)."); David Barron et al., Untangling the
Debate on Signing Statements, GEO. L. FAC. BLOG (July 31, 2006), http://gulcfac.typepad.
com/georgetown university_1aw/2006/07/thanks to-the-p.html ("[The Bush] Adminis-
tration has too frequently misused the avoidance canon to distort the meaning of statutory
provisions that were not ambiguous . . . .").
44 SeeJohnsen, supra note 3, at 1585, 1599-1600.
45 See id.
46 See Phillip J. Cooper, Signing Statements as Declaratory Judgments: The President as Judge,
16 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 253, 275-76 (2007); Peter M. Shane, Presidential Signing State-
ments and the Rule of Law as an "Unstructured Institution," 16 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 231,
234 (2007).
47 SeeJames Risen, Obama Takes on Congress Over Policy Czar Positions, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
16, 2011, at A17.
48 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appro-
priations Act, 2011, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 263 (Apr. 15, 2011).
49 See Barron et al., supra note 43 ("In many such cases, the President's view, reflected
in signing statements, is not that entire statutory provisions are facially unconstitutional,
but merely that the laws might be unconstitutional in some future hypothetical applications.").
50 Statement on Signing the Ronald Reagan Centennial Commission Act, 2009 DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 424 (June 2, 2009) (clarifying that members of Congress appointed to
the board of trustees of a congressionally-chartered foundation may "participate only in
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this approach drew Congress's ire5 1 because it declared, in essence,
that the President intended to put limits on the law's reach that the
law itself did not enumerate.
3. Creating a Paper Trail
Another purpose a president might have in offering a signing
statement is to generate a history of a law's interpretation to influence
those charged with applying it or to illustrate the President's power.
That is, a president may seek to influence how courts interpret a law,
how bureaucrats implement it, or how the nation understands presi-
dential power more generally. The first of these purposes is to create
legislative history as evidence of the intent behind the law's passage,
while the second is to bind administrators to conform their interpreta-
tion to the President's. The third is to stake out a position of presi-
dential power for later use.
a. Legislative History
President Ronald Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese,
broke new ground in advancing the use of signing statements as legis-
lative history. Meese and his advisors devised a program to strategi-
cally employ signing statements to influence judicial decisions.52 To
support this effort, he arranged for the West Publishing Company to
include presidential signing statements in the "Legislative History"
section of the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News.5 3
In a speech in February 1986, Meese explained that the purpose of
ceremonial or advisory functions ... and not in matters involving the administration of the
act"). However, like other presidents, President Obama has also issued signing statements
that "construe" or "interpret" statutes contrary to what a plain reading might suggest in
order to bring them into conformity with his understanding of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Statement on Signing the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, 2009 DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 201 (Mar. 30, 2009) (construing "provisions to require the Secretary [of
the Interior] to consider ... congressional recommendations, but not to be bound by
them"); Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, 2009 DAILY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 145 (Mar. 11, 2009) (interpreting several provisions as "precatory," "nonbind-
ing," and in a manner "consistent with my constitutional authority and responsibilities").
See generally Recent Signing Statement, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, 123 HARv. L. REv.
1051, 1051 (2010) (noting that Obama, like Bush, used "boilerplate" signing-statement
language and treated the signing statement as the "default executive mechanism").
51 See Charlie Savage, Obama's Embrace of Bush Tactic Criticized by Lawmakers from Both
Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A16.
52 See Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpreta-
tions of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 367
(1987); Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Litig. Study Working Grp. (Feb. 5, 1986) [hereinafter Alito Memo]
(discussing strategies on how to employ signing statements as a means to influence legisla-
tive history).
53 Christopher S. Kelley, A Matter of Direction: The Reagan Administration, the Signing
Statement, and the 1986 Westlaw Decision, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 283, 304-06 (2007).
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this move was to "make sure that the President's own understanding
of what's in a bill is the same . .. or is given consideration at the time
of statutory construction later on by a court."54
Less than five months later, the U.S. Supreme Court cited one of
Reagan's signing statements for authority in its opinion in Bowsher v.
Synar.5 5 Subsequent federal court opinions similarly relied, though
rarely, upon signing statements in their legal analyses.56
In support of the use of signing statements to generate legislative
history, Professors Steven Calabresi and Daniel Lev contend that the
President's intent in signing a law is highly probative of its meaning.5 7
This is true, they argue, because the President is one of only three
actors in the process of enacting legislation-along with the House
and Senate-and because the President's intent is unambiguous,58
unlike the intent of the other two.59 However, Calabresi and Lev's
reasoning appears circular in characterizing the President as "an in-
dispensible party to the enactment of any law that is not passed over
his veto or allowed to become law after ten days without his signa-
ture."60 Given that the only remaining path to becoming law is signa-
ture, this statement amounts to the tautology that the President's
signature is required for a bill to become law by his signature.
Other commentators emphasize the President's importance in
creating legislative history by ignoring the Constitution's provision for
a default enactment-relying instead on the false premise that the
President's signature is required for enactment.61 It is precisely the
fact that the President's signature is not necessary for enactment that
54 Garber & Wimmer, supra note 52, at 367.
55 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.1 (1986).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1994) (citing President
George H.W. Bush's signing statement, which characterized the gun control provision at
issue as "inappropriately overrid[ing] legitimate State firearms laws"); United States v. Cas-
tillo, 460 F.3d 337, 347 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing President Clinton's signing statement on a
bill enacted to adjust sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine). See generally Kristy L. Car-
roll, Comment, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?: Why and How Courts Should Use Presidential Sign-
ing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 475, 503-14 (1997)
(cataloguing various judicial approaches to the use of signing statements).
57 See Calabresi & Lev, supra note 3, at 5.
58 Id.
59 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
60 Calabresi & Lev, supra note 3, at 5.
61 E.g., Bradley & Posner, supra note 3, at 346 (incorrectly stating that "Article I pro-
vides that, absent a supermajority, Congress cannot enact legislation without the signature
of the president" and concluding that "[s]ince legislation reflects an agreement between
Congress and the president, the president's views about the agreement would seem to be
as relevant as Congress's views."); Alito Memo, supra note 52 ("Under the Constitution, a
bill becomes law only when passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President
(or enacted over his veto). Since the President's approval is just as important as that of the
House or Senate, it seems to follow that the President's understanding of the bill should be
just as important as that of Congress. . . . Under the Constitution (Art. I, sec. 7), if Con-
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militates against giving such importance to the President's intent. Un-
like the President, the approval of the House and Senate are necessary
to enact a law. Moreover, Congress may enact a law without the Presi-
dent's approval via a veto override or a default enactment. As Part IV
explains, recognizing that a bill may become law without the Presi-
dent's signature is important to understanding the President's role in
the process.
However, these same commentators advance an alternative argu-
ment-that, under Chevron62 and related doctrines, modern adminis-
trative law supports postenactment statutory interpretation by the
executive.63 Yet other commentators respond that Chevron is inappo-
site because it applies only when Congress has impliedly delegated
authority to the Executive through a statutory ambiguity, 64 and that
even then, the delegation is to the administrators who will apply the
law, not to the President himself.65
A final argument in favor of the legitimacy of the President's role
in legislative history emphasizes the President's general involvement
and influence in the lawmaking process-including initiation, com-
munication, negotiation, and approval or veto. 66 This argument also
finds some support among commentators who agree that the Presi-
dent plays a legitimate role in reviewing a law for constitutionality, but
who do not take the additional step of contending that the President's
interpretation should persuade courts.6 7 Nonetheless, the question of
the President's role in legislative history remains a source of substan-
tial controversy.68
gress is in session, a bill must be signed or vetoed within 10 days after its presentation to
the President.").
62 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984) ("[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department's con-
struction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .").
63 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 3, at 345-47; Calabresi & Lev, supra note 3, at 6-8.
64 See David C. Jenson, Note, From Deference to Restraint: Using the Chevron Framework to
Evaluate Presidential Signing Statements, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1908, 1909-10 (2007).
65 Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 696, 752 (2007).
66 See generally Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The President's Place in
"Legislative History, " 89 MicH. L. REV. 399 (1990).
67 See, e.g., Dellinger Signing Memo, supra note 33, at 135-36 & n.I1 ("[T]he Consti-
tution envisages that the President will be an important actor in the legislative pro-
cess . . .. Significantly, the President's veto power is placed in Article I, thereby indicating
that he has a share of the legislative power . . . .").
68 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 46, at 282 (" [C] ontemporary signing statement practice
has intruded upon the Article I powers ... and in some cases even appears intended to
preempt[ I the proper role of the judiciary under Article III.").
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b. "Executive History'69
As Professor Neal Devins explains, "By placing their views in the
open, signing statements allow Presidents to put an exclamation mark
behind their policy preferences."7 0 In this way, signing statements
provide the White House with a means to bind and centrally control
the various executive agencies.71 In fact, adds one commentator, "in-
fluenc[ing] bureaucratic decisionmaking" regarding statutory and
constitutional interpretation was the primary motivation behind the
Reagan Administration's effort to bolster the value of signing
statements. 72
Notably, even if Congress disputes the President's interpretation
of a statute or choices on whether and how to enforce a law, a court
will likely decline to intervene on the grounds that the dispute is a
nonjusticiable political question.7 3 Therefore, even if a signing state-
ment would not influence a court's statutory interpretation, it might
raise a red flag of nonjusticiability by signaling a conflict with Con-
gress. Thus, "executive history" may bind courts' hands even more
strongly than legislative history.
c. Staking Out a Position of Power
Finally, the President may seek to use a signing statement to stake
out a position on executive power even if the President is not con-
cerned that the bill in question would actually infringe upon it.74
That is, even if the President does not intend to use the power he
asserts in the signing statement with regard to the statute in question,
by repeatedly asserting that he has that power, he may influence pub-
lic, congressional, and judicial opinion about executive powers.
69 See Garber & Wimmer, supra note 52, at 367 (using the term "executive history" in a
pejorative sense to refer to illegitimate presidential attempts to influence legislative history,
rather than in the broader sense that this discussion describes).
70 Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government, 16 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
63, 78 (2007).
71 See Kelley, supra note 53, at 289-99, 304-06.
72 Id. at 305.
73 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(quoting President George W. Bush's signing statement and holding that whether the
State Department may disregard a statutory command to mark a person's passport as being
born in "Israel" when he was born in Jerusalem was a "nonjusticiable political question");
cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute
or enforce . . . is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.");
Johnsen, supra note 39, at 25 (contending that presidential nonenforcement is likely not
justiciable, though "raw power" to disregard a statute does not imply constitutionality).
74 See Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of "Signing and Not-Enforcing," 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 113, 126 (2007); see also Louis Fisher, Signing Statements: Constitu-
tional and Practical Limits, 16 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 183, 209-10 (2007) ("Objections in a
signing statement may be pure bluster and represent some sort of theoretical, impractical
protest created by imaginative attorneys in the Justice Department or the White House.").
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In fact, in the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) reports
to Congress75 regarding President Bush's use of signing statements, it
found little evidence that agencies had actually failed to comply as a
result of the signing statements.7 6 In addition, as Professors Curtis
Bradley and Eric Posner point out, "some [signing statements] specifi-
cally note that, despite the alleged constitutional problems, the execu-
tive will enforce the statute '[a]s a matter of comity.'" 7 7
While this analysis might seem to suggest that signing statements
are all bark and no bite, Professor Michael Rappaport identifies a dark
side: "[T]he practice of signing and not-enforcing provides the Presi-
dent with an incentive to adopt excessively broad constitutional inter-
pretations of his powers . . . ."7 The availability of the signing
statement, he argues, eliminates the President's incentive to moderate
his views on the expansiveness of executive powers because then the
President need not bear the costs of interpreting the powers broadly
(i.e., vetoing otherwise desirable laws that limit Executive power) .
Thus, Rappaport concludes that the lack of such a moderating incen-
tive may allow the President to later decide to apply this unduly ex-
pansive view by defying an enacted law.80
Ironically, over time, the routine issuance of such signing state-
ments may actually weaken the presidency. Having created the expec-
tation that the President will object each time a statute threatens
executive power, failing to do so on a particular occasion might jeop-
ardize the President's ability to preserve the point when it arises
later.81
75 U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SiGNING STATEMENTS ACCOMPANY-
ING THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS (2007) (original report), available at
www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED PROVISIONS OF
LAw (2008) (statement of Gary L. Kepplinger, General Counsel), available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08553t.pdf, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATE-
MENTs-AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF TEN PROVISIONS OF LAw (2007), available at
www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/309928.pdf.
76 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS Accom-
PANYING THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS 9 (2007) ("[W] e cannot conclude that
agency noncompliance was the result of the President's signing statements"); see also Nel-
son Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 95,
107-10 (2007) (" [I] t is unlikely that the agencies' behavior was affected by the President's
constitutional objections.").
77 Bradley & Posner, supra note 3, at 343 & n.123 (quoting Statement on Signing
Legislation to Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1070 (June 14, 2004)).
78 Rappaport, supra note 74, at 126.
79 Id. Contrast nonsigning statements, which do not provide such an incentive. See
infra text accompanying notes 243-47.
80 See Rappaport, supra note 74, at 126.
81 SeeJohn F. Cooney, Signing Statements: A Practical Analysis of the ABA Task Force Re-
port, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 656 (2007) ("[T~he ritualistic and non-strategic invocation of
separation of powers objections has trivialized the constitutional issues and bred congres-
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C. The Signing Statements Controversy
Although there had been some academic treatment of signing
statements prior to 2006, the public and legal debate fully engaged
only after President Bush issued signing statements that seemed to
eviscerate key provisions in the Detainee Treatment Act and the
reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act.8 2 Following a Boston Sun-
day Globe article reporting that "President Bush has quietly claimed the
authority to disobey more than 750 laws,"83 commentators noted that
Bush's style of signing statements was exceptional compared to those
of other presidents because their use was "ritualistic," and they con-
tained vague, boilerplate objections with little legal explanation.8 4
Unlike prior presidents who had generally used signing statements
only in "exceptional cases," Bush received criticism for disregarding
this "limiting principle" and issuing them as a routine.8 5
As the controversy reached a fever pitch, both the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees held hearings scrutinizing signing state-
ments.86 Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter even
introduced a bill aimed at preventing courts from citing signing state-
ments for authority and giving Congress standing to sue on the basis
of the claims in the signing statements.87
In the midst of the debate, an American Bar Association (ABA)
"blue-ribbon task force"8 issued a report concluding that signing
statements are "contrary to the rule of law"89 when they declare the
President's intention to disregard provisions of a law he has signed.
Furthermore, the report urged the President to veto any bill he be-
lieves to contain unconstitutional provisions.90 However, the report
conceded that presidents had often properly disregarded "legislative
veto"95 provisions and that when the President and Congress are una-
sional indifference to the President's positions, without generating public support for his
views.").
82 See Charlie Savage, Introduction: The Last Word? The Constitutional Implications of Presi-
dential Signing Statements, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1, 2 (2007).
83 See Savage, supra note 2.
84 See, e.g., Cooney, supra note 81, at 655-56.
85 See id.
86 Presidential Signing Statements Under the Bush Administration: A Threat to Checks and
Balances and the Rule of Law?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(2007); The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2006).
87 Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006).
88 Savage, supra note 82, at 5.
89 AM. BAR Ass'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARA-
TION OF PowERs DOCTRINE 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstate-
ments/abajfinal-signing-statements-recommendation-report37-24-06.pdf.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 9, 11. The Supreme Court ruled these provisions unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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ble to resolve their constitutional differences, sometimes "practical ex-
igencies militate against a veto."9 2
In general accord with the ABA position, some commentators ar-
gued that it is inconsistent with the constitutional structure for a presi-
dent to "sign and not-enforce"93 or "sign and denounce"94 a bill.95 A
central problem with the signing statement, they argued, is that by
signing a bill that the President himself claims has unconstitutional
provisions, the President either violates the oath to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution"9 6 or the duty to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed."9 7 If the President has objections, they argued,
the President should return the bill to Congress along with those ob-
jections, precisely as the Constitution's text provides.98
Nonetheless, Walter Dellinger and others who served in the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) during the Clinton Administration main-
tained their earlier position99 that constitutionally based signing
statements could serve legitimate purposes. 100 They argued, for exam-
ple, that when a provision in a bill is ambiguous, a signing statement is
a useful means for the President to apply a canon of construction to
avoid a constitutional conflict.10 ' Furthermore, the President might
announce his intent to disregard a provision that was "clearly invalid
under governing Supreme Court precedent.""02 For example, a presi-
dent could safely issue a signing statement declaring an intent to dis-
regard a legislative-veto provision. 0 3
The lesson then, argued the Clinton DOJ veterans, is not to throw
out the signing-statement baby with the bathwater of the Bush Admin-
istration's abuses.104 Accordingly, President Obama issued a memo-
randum shortly after taking office that declared that any signing
statements that he might author would be "based only on interpreta-
tions of the Constitution that are well-founded" and would make only
92 Am. BAR Ass'N, supra note 89, at 23.
93 See Rappaport, supra note 74, at 120-24.
94 See Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 81, 81 (2007).
95 Cf GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY STATE 221 (2010) ("[S]igning statements clearly go against the Constitution's structure,
in which the legislature makes law and the President executes it.").
96 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
97 Id. § 3.
98 Id. at art. I, § 7, cl, 2.
99 See generally Dellinger Signing Memo, supra note 33.
too See Barron et al., supra note 43, at 3.
101 See id. at 6-7.
102 See id. at 3.
103 SeeJohnsen, supra note 3, at 1592-93; Johnsen, supra note 39, at 8.
104 See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 3, at 1586 ("Critics ... should take care not to con-
demn legitimate methods of presidential legal interpretation when the true problem lies
with the specific substance of the Bush Administration's flawed legal reasoning.").
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"legitimate" constructions of statutory provisions to avoid constitu-
tional conflicts.105 However, as Professor Michael Dorf points out, this
position essentially reduces to the contention that Clinton and
Obama's signing statements were proper because they were right
about the Constitution but that Bush's signing statements were uncon-
stitutional because he was wrong.10 6 Unfortunately, such conclusory
pronouncements about the need to adhere to "legitimate" constitu-
tional interpretations do not yield a workable standard to evaluate fu-
ture signing statements.
Yet, as Professor Laurence Tribe insists, 07 and the Clinton DOJ
veterans themselves acknowledge, 08 the real problem may not lie with
signing statements themselves. Rather, the true target of critics' con-
cerns is the possibility that the President might refuse to comply with
an enacted law. 09 Professors Bradley and Posner go further to con-
tend that the controversy is not even about the President's actions at
all: "Rather, the objection is to the possibility that courts will give
weight to such statements when interpreting statutes.""l0
Finally, one view holds that the President may issue a signing
statement regardless of a bill's constitutionality because there is no
danger that the President's signature would enact unconstitutional
provisions-such provisions are by definition a "nullity," 1 having "no
legal effect" 12 because they conflict with the Constitution. The only
violation, in this view, would be enforcing an unconstitutional law, not
signing it." 3 Commentators frequently point to President Thomas
Jefferson's decision to disregard the Sedition Act as an example of the
President's legitimate power to declare a law null if it is plainly
unconstitutional.x4
105 Barack Obama, Memorandum on Presidential Signing Statements, 2009 DAILY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 138 (Mar. 9, 2009).
106 See Michael C. Dorf, Signing Statements Redux, DORF ON LAw (Aug. 15, 2009, 3:14
AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/08/signing-statements-redux.html.
107 Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., 'Signing Statements'Are a Phantom Target, Bos. GLOBE,
Aug. 9, 2006, at A9, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/arti-
cles/2006/08/09/signingstatements-are-aphantomtarget/.
108 See Barron et al., supra note 43.
109 See Tribe, supra note 107.
110 Bradley & Posner, supra note 3, at 344-45.
III Lund, supra note 76, at 101; see alsoJohnsen, supra note 39, at 17-22 (describing the
view that the President has the duty of "executive review" independent of the other
branches of government).
112 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 3, at 340-41; see also Issues Raised by Provisions
Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 31-36 (1992)
(memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney General Timothy E. Flanigan) ("[A]n un-
constitutional statute . . . is simply not a law at all . . . [and] cannot be one of the 'Laws'
that the President must faithfully execute.").
113 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 3, at 340-41.
114 See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disregard Unconstitu-
tional Laws, 96 GEo. L.J. 1613, 1664-72 (2008) (describing Jefferson's decision to direct
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However, Jefferson did not sign the Sedition Act into law; his
predecessor, John Adams, did.' 15 Furthermore, the view that the Pres-
ident may both sign a bill and freely declare its provisions null appears
to be in the minority. This position is generally associated with those
who contend that the President need not defer to congressional or
Supreme Court constitutional interpretations' 1 6 and that he may as-
sert the "unitary executive" theory of the presidency to disregard pro-
visions that he believes conflict with it.'" 7
II
CONSENSUS PRINCIPLES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OATH TO
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION
Although there remains considerable debate about the use of
signing statements, recent commentary reveals some consensus princi-
ples for understanding the President's constitutional role upon pre-
sentment. However, to find where a presidential nonsigning statement
may be appropriate, it is also necessary to derive some additional prin-
ciples for when the President may have the discretion to use it.
Between the safe harbor for permissible signatures and the do-
main of obligatory vetoes lies a yet-undefined area where a default
enactment accompanied by a nonsigning statement may be appropri-
ate. While Professors Dawn Johnsen and David Barron have laid out
factors for presidential nonenforcement of enacted laws, 1 s this Note
sets forth a different, but related, set of factors for the President to
consider regarding whether he may allow a bill to become law in the
first place. These principles derive from what appear to be points of
relative consensus in the otherwise divisive debate over signing
statements.
A. Understanding the President's Role
The Constitution requires the President to both "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed"' 19 and take an oath to "preserve, pro-
tect and defend the Constitution of the United States." 120 When Con-
gress presents the President with a constitutionally objectionable bill,
district attorneys to cease prosecutions under the Sedition Act because it was "unconstitu-
tional and null").
115 See id. at 1662.
116 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 76, at 101-07.
117 See, e.g., Calabresi & Lev, supra note 3, at 8.
118 See David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President's Non-En-
forcement Power, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 61, 64 (2000); Johnsen, supra note 39, at 52-54.
119 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
120 Id. § 1, cl. 8.
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those duties are in tension. 21 On the one hand, the President
pledges an oath to uphold the Constitution. On the other hand, the
President must "faithfully" execute laws that might appear to conflict
with the Constitution.
However, determining what "the Laws" are is perhaps the most
difficult task in complying with these constitutional commands, given
that American laws are comprised of the Constitution, statutes, and
judicial precedent.122 Thus, when reviewing a bill from Congress, the
President must consider what effect, if any, the oath should have in
informing the decision to sign, veto, or allow a default enactment.
And, once a bill has been enacted, the President must consider what
the duty to "faithfully execute[ ]" it entails.
The first principle that the commentary reveals is that it is impor-
tant to distinguish between the President's issuing a statement about a
law and declining to comply with it.1 2 3 It should be relatively uncon-
troversial that the President may opine as he wishes about legisla-
tion. 124 Indeed, one would expect that the President, as an elected
politician, should take positions on the desirability and constitutional-
ity of various proposals and make them known to the public. The
problem arises when the President's speech comes in the form of an
executive order to an administrative agency to ignore or implausibly
construe an enacted provision. In other words, it is the President's
actions-not words-that matter.
Second, and relatedly, the President should make constitutional
and statutory interpretations in the light of day.125 Checks and bal-
ances only work when the other branches are aware of how the Presi-
dent is interpreting, implementing, or declining to enforce provisions
that have been duly enacted into law.' 26 Pushing the President under-
ground in his interpretation or enforcement of an enacted law is
counterproductive, defeating both the constitutional structure of
121 See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, What's a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in
the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REv. 395, 407-19 (2008) (distinguishing
the President's "interpretive authority" from his "nonenforcement authority").
122 Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 115 (2000).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
124 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 3, at 358 ("[T]he president has the right to state
his views about the constitutionality of a statute, [and] he should state his views sooner
rather than later . . . ."); cf John F. Cooney, supra note 81, at 651-52 (2007) (comparing
signing statements to other "informal mechanisms" the President may use to express his
views).
125 Cf Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEv- AND HoW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .").
126 See Fisher, supra note 74, at 204 (discussing the harm to "constitutional government
and the rule of law" inflicted by the secret Iran-contra statutory violations); Barron et al.,
supra note 43.
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checks and balances and democratic review of executive decisions. 12 7
The problems inherent in the uncertainty about enforcement, consti-
tutionality, and interpretation of enacted laws require the President to
be transparent in deciding those questions.128 Otherwise, it would be
impossible for voters to evaluate the President's job performance and
for the coordinate branches to properly check and balance the execu-
tive power. The Constitution itself reflects the importance of this
transparency through the President's reporting requirements: the
President must (1) provide Congress with objections to any vetoed
bill,129 (2) "from time to time give to the Congress Information of the
State of the Union,"130 and (3) "recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."' 3 '
Third, the President has greater power and duties to protect the
institution of the Presidency (and thus, interpret Article II) than he
does for other areas of the Constitution. As Walter Dellinger ex-
plained, "The President has enhanced responsibility to resist unconsti-
tutional provisions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of
the Presidency. . . . If the President does not challenge such provi-
sions (i.e., by refusing to execute them), there often will be no occa-
sion for judicial consideration of their constitutionality . . . ."12 And,
as Alexander Hamilton described in The Federalist No. 73, the Constitu-
tion provides the President with a qualified veto power as a "shield" to
defend himself against "the depredations of [Congress]. [Without it,
he] might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolu-
tions, or annihilated by a single vote." 33
127 Cf Johnsen, supra note 3, at 1591 ("Signing statements that announce the Presi-
dent's legal views or intent regarding implementation of a law ... provide the public with
valuable information . . .).
128 See Malinda Lee, Comment, Reorienting the Debate on Presidential Signing Statements:
The Need for Transparency in the President's Constitutional Objections, Reservations, and Assertions
of Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 705, 725-27, 733-41 (2008).
129 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
130 Id. at art. II, § 3.
131 Id.
132 Dellinger Execution Memo, supra note 39, at 201; accordJohnsen, supra note 39, at
51. But see Constitutionality of GAO's Bid Protest Function: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis.
and Nat'l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong. 27-28 (1985) (testimony of
Mark Tushnet) ("[R]efusing to comply with enacted legislation appears to thwart rather
than promote a responsible dialogue. . . . Surely it is better . . . to structure the process of
constitutional discussion in a less awkward and confrontational way. The veto provision
seems admirably suited to the task.").
133 THE FEDERALIST No. 73 at 547 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., J.B.
Lippincott & Co. 1864) (1788).
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B. Factors Bearing on a President's Duty to Veto
Unconstitutional Laws
Other principles can be derived concerning the President's duty
to veto unconstitutional bills. While there is certainly disagreement
on how strict this duty is, there are some helpful factors for the Presi-
dent to consider in his analysis. In general, it seems fair to say that the
President's duty to veto varies with two major factors: (1) the severity
of the President's constitutional concerns about a provision and (2)
the centrality of that provision to the legislative scheme of the bill.
That is, the more patently unconstitutional the President interprets
the provision to be, and the more it lies at the "core"'34 of the bill's
legislative scheme, the greater the President's obligation to veto it
becomes.
Before fleshing out each major factor, it is first helpful to respond
to the theory that the President can sign a bill with even plainly un-
constitutional provisions because they are a "nullity" with "no legal
effect."135 The principal flaw in this theory is that, notwithstanding a
president's view that he is signing into law a bill with certain null provi-
sions, those provisions will still be law for future presidents to deal
with. In other words, the provisions would still be "on the books"136
and may be interpreted very differently by future presidents. As Pro-
fessor Akhil Amar observes, "the law itself might be effectively revived
if a successor president . . . does not share its predecessor's constitu-
tional doubts."137 For example, shortly after taking office, President
Obama directed executive agencies to consult with DOJ before relying
on signing statements from previous presidents as the basis for disre-
garding enacted laws.""s
Though the people in government ordinarily change from one
administration to the next, the applicability of existing laws does not.
Otherwise, the founding-era principle that the nation has "a govern-
ment of laws and not of men"' 39 would seem to be in jeopardy. Thus,
the variation between one administration that deems a law "null" and
the next that deems it "valid" poses a significant problem for stability
in the law and for the stability of the Executive Branch itself.
Moreover, the fact that a scholar contends that a provision should
not be given legal effect because it is technically a "nullity" does not
134 See Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy,
16 WM. & MARv BILL RTs. J. 11, 23-25 (2007) (contending that a veto is preferable when
"the President believes [legislation] violates the Constitution at its core").
135 See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
136 See Rappaport, supra note 74, at 121.
137 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 559 n.19 (2005).
138 Obama, supra note 105.
139 See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (incorporating the principle often credited to
John Adams).
[Vol. 96:15031522
2011] THE PRESIDENTTAL NONSIGNING STATEMENT
mean that a president will not do so. Of course, The United States Re-
ports are full of cases in which the Supreme Court struck down uncon-
stitutional laws that presidents had previously given effect. In other
words, this argument fails to make the critical is/ought distinction-
between what ought to be done and what is actually done.140
1. The Severity of Constitutional Concerns About a Provision
Turning back to the "severity of constitutional concerns" that
bears on a duty to veto, the commentary discloses some subfactors
that this major factor entails.
The first consideration is the clarity of the provision's constitu-
tional violation, 141 which includes accounting for Supreme Court pre-
cedent.14 2 This suggests that a president's degree of constitutional
concerns is influenced in part by how clearly he believes that the pro-
vision violates the Constitution, taking special account of any existing
Supreme Court precedent that might be instructive on the question.
The second consideration concerns the availability of reasonable
constructions to avoid a conflict with the Constitution.143 That is, if it
were possible that the President could reasonably apply an "avoid-
ance" canon or "saving" construction to the statute such that it would
not conflict with the Constitution, then the President's concerns
about the statute's unconstitutionality should diminish. However, the
emphasis here must be on "reasonable"-as discussed above, presi-
dents have abused this approach to construe legislative language
against its plain meaning. The availability of such constructions de-
pends on the existence of legitimate ambiguity in the provision.
Third, the President should consider the likelihood of future
facts arising under which the application of the provision would be
unconstitutional. 144 Even if a provision is not clearly unconstitutional
on its face, if facts are likely to arise under which its application would
be unconstitutional, the President's concerns would be increased. If
such an application is unlikely, however, such concerns would be
mitigated.
140 The argument sounds in the converse of the is/ought fallacy famously identified by
David Hume. See 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (David Fate Norton &
MaryJ. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1739). Here, the normative judgment that
an unconstitutional provision ought not be given effect does not logically imply that it is not
or will not be given effect.
141 See MAY, supra note 31, at 146-47; see also supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
142 Cf Dellinger Execution Memo, supra note 39, at 199 (contending that a president
should enforce a statute if he believes that the Supreme Court would uphold it). But see
infra text accompanying notes 234-40 (discussing the problem of judicial
underenforcement).
143 Cf, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 554-55 (2002) (explaining the canon
of constitutional avoidance). See generally Crabb, supra note 42.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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Fourth, a President's concerns may depend on the directness of a
provision's challenge to executive authority.145 If a provision appears
to infringe upon executive authority or to otherwise threaten the in-
tegrity of Article II of the Constitution, then the President's concerns
should increase. The absence of these concerns, however, should not
minimize any other concerns that the President has based on the
other considerations listed here. Nonetheless, as Professor Johnsen
argues, "the President's decisions must reflect the relative competen-
cies of the branches as well as the vehicles for inter-branch dialogue
conducive to principled constitutional interpretation."' 46 In other
words, the President should not manufacture a spurious conflict with
executive power as a pretext for avoiding the application of a law, and
the President should maintain ongoing dialogue with and have due
regard for the coordinate branches of government.147
Finally, the President's constitutional concerns should be in-
formed by "whether Congress, in fact, expressed a constitutional judg-
ment in enacting the statute."148 If it is apparent that Congress gave
little consideration to potential concerns about a provision's constitu-
tionality, then the President might feel freer to assert his own inter-
pretation. On the other hand, if Congress made a considerable good-
faith analysis of the provision's constitutionality, then the President
should appropriately give some deference to that determination when
evaluating the severity of his own constitutional concerns.
2. A Provision's Centrality to the Legislative Scheme
This factor is conceptually straightforward, yet it might be more
difficult to apply in practice. In essence, a provision's "centrality to
the legislative scheme" refers to the question of how important a role
it plays in the overall bill. A key inquiry, then, is whether the provision
is a minor, nongermane element in massive omnibus legislation, or
whether Congress passed the bill with the primary purpose of making
this particular provision law.14 9 The greater the importance of the
145 See supra note 132-33 and accompanying text (discussing the President's duty to
defend the institutional authority of the executive branch); cf Johnsen, supra note 39, at
50-52 ("The executive branch typically has justified enhanced non-enforcement authority
when the President's powers are threatened as necessary to self-defense .
146 Johnsen, supra note 39, at 39.
147 Cf id. at 39-40.
148 SeeJohnsen, supra note 39, at 46; see also Barron, supra note 118, at 90 (contending
that the President, like the Supreme Court, should also "be bound by rules of deference to
competing interpreters, the Congress included").
149 See Cass & Strauss, supra note 134, at 21-23 (arguing that presidents, like legislators
and judges, are not required to disapprove of an entire statute merely because it contains
individual provisions that are unconstitutional); see also AMAR, supra note 137.
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unconstitutional provision, the greater the obligation to veto be-
comeso50 as opposed to a decision to "sign and denounce."115
In the era of omnibus legislation when few bills have only one
purpose, it may be impractical or imprudent to veto entire legislative
packages on the grounds that one or two provisions contain minor
flaws. President Obama's Press Secretary Robert Gibbs explained:
"[S]igning statements have been in existence for two centuries in or-
der for Presidents to make known constitutional problems with ideas
that are in legislation without necessarily dealing a veto to the entire
piece of legislation. Obviously the proliferation of omnibus legisla-
tion has made that even more prevalent."I 52 Accordingly, part of the
calculus under this factor may include evaluating how compelling the
need is for passing the overall bill that contains the questionable pro-
visions.s53 In fact, one commentator has recently argued that "[t] here
are many situations where the President is constitutionally required to
pass a law that is partly unconstitutional." 54
III
THE DEFAULT ENACTMENT AND THE THREE LIES15 5
or CHADHA
Although INS v. Chadha'5 6 held that the procedure for enacting
laws requires bicameral passage and presentment to the President, 57
it is susceptible to misreading. It is often cited for Chief Justice Bur-
ger's memorable dictum that the Constitution provides a "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" for enacting
laws.' 5 8 Read in isolation, however, this statement tends to mislead in
150 SeeJohnsen, supra note 39, at 33.
151 See Prakash, supra note 94, at 81.
152 See The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (Mar. 9,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Briefing-by-White-House-
Press-Secretary-Robert-Gibbs-3-9-09.
153 SeeJohnsen, supra note 39, at 33-34 (citing Franklin Roosevelt's decision to sign
the Lend Lease Act as "a compelling example" of the need to pass a large bill despite
objections to individual provisions).
154 William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 322 (2011).
155 The John Harvard Statue at Harvard University is commonly known as "the statue
of three lies." Dan Zhang, A Guide to Boston for Your Visiting Family and Friends, 11 BBS
BULL., May/June 2007, at 2 (explaining that although the inscription reads "John Harvard,
Founder, 1638," none of the three statements is true), available at http://dmsbulletin.
hms.harvard.edu/pdf/MayJune2007.pdf. Similarly, one might say that Chadha tells three
lies about statutes.
156 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
157 Id. at 958; see also supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
158 Id. at 951; see, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998); Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252,
274 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 768 (1986); AM. BAR ASs'N, supra note 89, at
18, 20; Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119
YALE L.J. 140, 197 (2009); Johnsen, supra note 39, at 30.
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three ways: the procedure for enacting laws is neither "single," "finely
wrought," nor "exhaustively considered." Addressing these potential
misinterpretations will serve to demonstrate why the President may
allow a bill to become law by default (i.e., unsigned) instead of facing
a binary choice of veto versus approval. It also presents an opportu-
nity for analysis of the Constitution's provisions on the enactment of
laws.
A. There Is Not Only a "Single" Way for a Bill to Become Law
Contrary to Chadha's potential implication that there is only a
"single" way for a bill to become law, there are actually three: (1) the
President may sign the bill upon presentment from Congress, (2)
Congress may enact it alone by overriding a presidential veto with a
two-thirds vote in each house, and (3) the bill may become law with-
out the President's signature upon the expiration of ten days ("Sun-
days excepted") after presentment, when Congress has not "by their
Adjournment prevent[ed] its Return."' 5 9 Thus, not only are there
three ways for a bill to become law, but the latter two do not entail any
approval from the President, and the last (the default enactment)
does not involve any presidential action at all.
B. The Procedure for Enactment Is Not "Finely Wrought"
Far from a "finely wrought" procedure for enactment, the Consti-
tution's provisions are ambiguous, difficult to read, and appear at
once redundant and contradictory. One significant source of ambigu-
ity and controversy surrounds the meaning of the phrase "unless the
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return." 60 Courts have
struggled considerably with this phrase in litigation over whether a
pocket veto has been properly achieved.16' What is an "adjourn-
ment"? When does it "prevent" the return of a bill? Could this
change over time, depending on Congress's custom and whom it
might designate to receive a returned bill? Courts have not clearly
answered these questions and generally limit their holdings on these
matters to the facts of the cases.16 2
159 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 587-88 (1938) (holding that "Con-
gress" for the purposes of the Return Clause means both the House and the Senate acting
together); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1932) (holding that the Presi-
dent may properly sign a bill into law after congressional adjournment); The Pocket Veto
Case, 279 U.S. 655, 680 (1929) (holding that "adjournment" need not be final to effect a
pocket veto); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a brief
intrasession recess did not "prevent" the return of a bill).
162 See generally supra note 161.
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Also, in literal terms, the Constitution's text appears to contradict
itself twice on whether anything other than a signature or veto over-
ride can make a bill become law, and it appears to contain redundant
language on the requirements to override a veto. On the first pass,
Article I, Section Seven might be read to require the President to veto
a bill if he does not approve of it: "If he approve he shall sign it, but if
not he shall return it . . . ."163 However, three sentences later, the
same clause provides for the disposition of a bill when the President
defaults on what earlier appeared to be the duty to either sign or re-
turn the bill within ten days of its presentment. 1 64
As mentioned above, when the President takes no action, but
Congress prevents the return of the bill by its adjournment, the bill
does not become law. 165 This disposition is well-known as a "pocket
veto," and the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged it as legiti-
mate in The Pocket Veto Case'66 and its progeny, with no suggestion that
by failing to sign, the President has acted unconstitutionally.167
Conversely, when Congress has not prevented the bill's return by
adjourning, the bill becomes law.168 Thus, the bill becomes law by
default, with no action from the President. Though this mechanism
for enactment has no common name, this Note refers to it as a "de-
fault enactment." If a President's nonsigning is constitutional when it
results in a pocket veto, then a nonsigning must be likewise constitu-
tional when it results in a default enactment. Indeed, the Constitu-
tion's text is on point: " [T] he Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if
he had signed it .... "169
Yet, in the next clause, the section appears to contradict itself
again by seeming to exclusively require either a signature or veto over-
ride for enactment: "[B] efore [a legislative measure] shall take Effect,
[it] shall be approved by [the President], or being disapproved by
him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives ... ." 170 Not only does this clause seem to contradict the
previous one, it appears redundant as well. Regarding the veto over-
ride, the previous clause states the identical procedure: "If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it
shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by
163 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
164 Id. ("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Man-
ner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in
which Case it shall not be a Law.").
165 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
166 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
167 See generally supra note 161.
168 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
169 Id.
170 Id. at cl. 3.
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which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds
of that House, it shall become a Law."17 '
Surely, it cannot be literally true that a section with language as
tortuous, redundant, and self-contradictory as this one is "finely
wrought."
C. The Procedure for Enactment Is Not "Exhaustively
Considered"
There was neither an exhaustive consideration of the enactment
provisions by its framers nor by modern courts and commentators. In
particular, records from the framers reveal little consideration of the
default enactment and pocket veto provisions, and jurists sometimes
forget about or ignore them.
The original public meaning and intention of the framers are un-
clear regarding the Constitution's default-enactment provision. 72
During the constitutional convention debates, there was very little dis-
cussion of it, only deciding that the period for presidential decision
should be ten days rather than seven 173 and that it was unnecessary to
clarify that they be ten whole days.174 Moreover, the record reflects a
desire to expedite the consideration of this section of the Constitution
and move on to other provisions. 75 Consequently, there appears to
be no evidence that the framers gave anything like an exhaustive con-
sideration of the default enactment provision.
Modern jurists also sometimes fail to consider the importance of
the default enactment provisions. As discussed above, some commen-
tators forget about or ignore the possibility of a default enactment
when overstating the President's importance in the enactment pro-
171 Id. at cl. 2.
172 Others have likewise searched in vain for founding-era discussion of this provision,
which also governs the pocket veto. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 675-76
(1929); Constitutionality of the President's "Pocket Veto" Power, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 6 (1971) (testimony of
then-Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist); Robert J. Spitzer, The "Protective
Return" Pocket Veto: Presidential Aggrandizement of Constitutional Power, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 720, 722 (2001).
173 See 5 THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, IN THE CON-
VENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 431 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, J.B. Lippin-
cott & Co. Supp. 1845) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
174 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 608 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 1966) (1911).
175 During the Federal Convention's consideration of the provisions, "[a] number of
members [were] being very impatient & calling for the question." Id. at 608. Indeed,
during the pertinent discussion, then-delegate and future Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Rutledge "complained much of the tediousness of the proceedings." ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES, supra note 173, at 431.
1528 [Vol. 96:1503
2011] THE PRESIDENTIAL NONSIGNING STATEMENT
cess. 1 76 Likewise, federal courts sometimes brush past the possibility
of a default enactment. As noted above, in Clinton v. City of New York,
the Supreme Court implied that the President must either sign or veto
a bill upon presentment,'7 7 and more troublingly, its holding erred in
stating that "[t] he Constitution explicitly requires" approval by both
Congress and the President "before a bill may 'become a law.' "178
Moreover, in 2003, an Eleventh Circuit opinion incorrectly stated that
"the only actions of Congress that have legally operative effect are
those acts that . .. are either signed by the President or repassed by a
supermajority vote to break a presidential veto." 179 Furthermore, as
discussed in Part IV, scholarship has yet to consider the viability of
offering a nonsigning statement instead of the much-disputed signing
statement.180
However, in Edwards v. United States, the Supreme Court did pro-
vide some helpful judicial gloss on the purpose and meaning of the
default enactment clause:
[T]his provision clearly indicates two definite and controlling pur-
poses: First. To insure promptness and to safeguard the opportunity
of the Congress for reconsideration of bills which the President dis-
approves; hence, the fixing of a time limit so that the status of mea-
sures shall not be held indefinitely in abeyance through inaction on
the part of the President. Second. To safeguard the opportunity of
the President to consider all bills presented to him, so that it may
not be destroyed by the adjournment of the Congress during the
time allowed to the President for that purpose. 8 1
Accordingly, despite the lack of textual clarity or "exhaustive" consid-
eration, it is settled that a bill may properly become law by default. 182
IV
A THIRD WAY: THE PRESIDENTIAL NONSIGNING STATEMENT
Although presidents have often issued signing statements to ex-
press concerns about bills they have just signed, a better option might
be to allow such a bill to become law unsigned (by default enactment)
and to issue an accompanying nonsigning statement explaining the Pres-
176 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; cf WILLS, supra note 95, at 215 ("The
Constitution provides that laws will not go into effect until signed by the President, but that
merely means that he has received and recognized the law given him for execution.").
177 See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
178 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 7); see also supra note 30.
179 Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
180 See infta notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
181 286 U.S. 482, 486 (1932).
182 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a
bill became law without President Nixon's signature, despite his contention that he had
pocket-vetoed it).
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ident's reasons for abstention. This Part sets forth the precedent for
using nonsigning statements, explains when doing so may be appro-
priate, and describes significant constitutional and political differ-
ences between signing statements and nonsigning statements.
A. Precedent for the Use of the Nonsigning Statement
Presidents Richard Nixon18 3 and George H.W. Bush1 84 issued
nonsigning statements objecting to bills on constitutional grounds.' 8 5
Each bill became law by a default enactment.
Nixon objected to a bill that gave the federal courts jurisdiction
over certain matters related to the Watergate investigation. In his
nonsigning statement, he wrote,
The legislation now before me gives to the Congress a broad gen-
eral grant of that authority which properly resides exclusively in the
executive branch . . . . I cannot give the sanction of the executive
branch to this bad legislation by signing it into law; neither, in the
present circumstances, will I veto it.1 8 6
Though Nixon may not generally be remembered as a staunch de-
fender of the Constitution, this nonsigning statement is one prece-
dent worthy of recognition.
President George H.W. Bush issued two nonsigning statements:
one on a bill banning the burning of the American flag'87 and an-
other on a bill that "limit[ed] the amount of advertising that broad-
183 Richard Nixon, Statement About a Bill Conferring Jurisdiction Upon the United
States District Court in Civil Actions Brought by the Senate Select Committee on Presiden-
tial Campaign Activities, PUB. PAPERS 1015 (Dec. 17, 1973).
184 See George H.W. Bush, Bush Statement on the Children's Television Act of 1990, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1425 (Oct. 17, 1990) [hereinafter Bush, Children's Television Act Statement]
(objecting to the Children's Television Act of 1990 on First Amendment grounds, sug-
gesting that "a constitutional challenge to this legislation may provide the Supreme Court
with an occasion to reconsider its [precedent].") George H.W. Bush, Statement on the
Flag Protection Act of 1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1403 (Oct. 26, 1989) [hereinafter Bush, Flag
Protection Act Statement] ("I have serious doubts that it can withstand Supreme Court
review.").
185 Presidents have also issued nonsigning statements with nonconstitutional policy ob-
jections. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Statement on the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1009 (Aug. 2, 1988); Gerald Ford, Statement on a Bill
Prohibiting Changes in the Food Stamp Program, I PUB. PAPERS 236 (Feb. 13, 1975); Rich-
ard Nixon, Statement on Allowing the Emergency Community Facilities Act of 1970 to
Become Law Without Signature, PUB. PAPERS 822 (Oct. 6, 1970); Richard Nixon, Statement
About the Special Milk Program Authorization, PUB. PAPERS 541 (June 30, 1970); Franklin
D. Roosevelt, Statement of the President on Allowing Solider Vote Bill to Become Law
Without His Signature, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 111
(Mar. 31, 1944); Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Criticizes the Rider Method of Legis-
lation and the Termination of His Authority to Limit Salaries, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 157 (Apr. 11, 1943).
186 See supra note 183, at 361-62.
187 See supra note 184.
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casters may air during children's programming."18 8 In each case,
Bush based his objections on the First Amendment, though in princi-
ple he actually supported the bill prohibiting flag burning despite his
constitutional concerns. Nonetheless, he was correct in his constitu-
tional analysis of that bill: in 1990, the Supreme Court held that it
violated the First Amendment.'89
Finally, at least one governor has also issued a constitutionally
based nonsigning statement. In 2005, Indiana Governor Mitch Dan-
iels wrote: "My decision not to sign reflects my degree of uncertainty
as to the constitutionality of this bill .... "190 Like Nixon and Bush,
Daniels received little or no attention for his twist on the more com-
mon signing statement, nor was there any public outcry that the state-
ments were themselves constitutionally objectionable. Thus, as
described below, nonsigning statements could be repurposed from
rare procedural anomalies into an innovation that would meet the
problems that have recently arisen regarding signing statements.
B. The Void in Scholarship on the Nonsigning Statement
A review of the literature discloses no substantive discussion of
the President's option to issue a nonsigning statement. Professor
Christopher May briefly acknowledged it as a hypothetical but stated
that he was "unable to find any case where the reason for [permitting
a default enactment and offering a nonsigning statement] was that
the law was unconstitutional."' However, in a table of signing state-
ments later in his book, May flagged the Nixon statement quoted
above as a "non-signing statement."192 Even if Nixon did not obvi-
ously express constitutional concerns in that nonsigning statement, 93
Bush's two nonsigning statements did so explicitly. 194 Thus, despite
May's extensive cataloguing of signing statements,195 he appears to
have overlooked these instances of constitutionally based nonsigning
statements.
Looking further back in time, a canonical 19th-century treatise
on the presidential veto power states that there are "five ways in which
a President of the United States may treat a bill" upon presentment:
(1) sign it into law; (2) sign it and "send to Congress a protest against
188 See Bush, Children's Television Act Statement, supra note 184, at 1425.
189 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
190 Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Governor Daniels' Letter Regarding SEA 512 (Apr. 27,
2005), http://www.in.gov/apps/utils/calendar/presscal?PF=gov2&Clist=196&Elist=83618.
191 MAY, supra note 31, at 40.
192 Id. at 80 tbl.5.2. This table footnote is the only previous use of the term "non-
signing statement" that I could find in the sparse scholarship on this point.
193 See the pertinent text of Nixon's statement supra accompanying note 186.
194 See supra note 184.
195 See MAY, supra note 31, at 72-80.
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those provisions in the measure of which he disapproves. This is a
method . . . not recognized by the Constitution"; (3) allow it to be-
come law by not signing it, when it was "presented to the President
more than ten days before the close of a session of Congress"; (4) not
sign it when it was presented "within ten days of the end of a session of
Congress," effecting "the well-known 'pocket-veto'"; or (5) veto the
bill.19 6 While this list treats the signing statement as its own "way" and
acknowledges the default enactment as a separate way, it neglects to
acknowledge that the President might also offer a statement upon not
signing the bill.
C. When the Use of the Nonsigning Statement May Be
Appropriate
Consider the following typical case of a president's constitutional
concerns about a bill: Upon presentment from Congress, the Presi-
dent (or his staff) identifies a small number of provisions that appear
to fall into a constitutional gray area. Here, if the President were to
apply the analysis described in Part II.B, he would likely determine
that his concerns about those provisions are not severe and that the
provisions are not central to the legislative scheme of the bill. 197 In this
case, as we have seen, the consensus suggests that the President is not
obligated to veto the bill.198 Nonetheless, the President may wish to
clarify that he does not endorse-literally or figuratively-those provi-
sions about which he has constitutional concerns. Thus, a nonsigning
statement may be appropriate where the President's constitutional
concerns about the bill are not severe enough to require a veto, but
where those concerns are significant enough to register in a public
statement.
This constitutional gray area is analogous in some respects to the
"zone of twilight" that Justice Jackson identified in his concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,'99 describing where
the distribution of power between Congress and the President is un-
certain.200 Here, where the constitutionality of a congressionally en-
rolled provision is uncertain, the President's own obligations under
the Take Care Clause and the Oath Clause are likewise in tension.
This Note seeks to offer a useful alternative to signing statements in
such cases of uncertain constitutionality, while avoiding the ideologi-
cally charged debate about whether the President may sign a bill into
196 EDWARD CAMPBELL MASON, THE VETO POWER: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND FUNC-
TION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1789-1889) 24 (Albert Bushnell Hart
ed., Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890).
197 See discussion supra Part II.B.
198 See discussion supra Part II.B.
199 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (JacksonJ., concurring).
200 See Strauss, supra note 122, at 119.
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law that he believes to have serious constitutional defects and then
announce in a signing statement that he intends to disregard portions
of it. In fact, even opponents of signing statements have generally
avoided taking a stand on their permissibility when the provision in
question is not patently unconstitutional.20
Although a nonsigning statement could not convert an unconsti-
tutional exercise of presidential power into a constitutional one, it
could be a useful alternative in cases of legitimate doubt regarding
statutory construction. Here, Governor Daniels's rationale in his non-
signing statement is instructive: "My decision not to sign reflects my
degree of uncertainty as to the constitutionality of this bill . . . . On
the other hand, our system establishes a presumption in favor of a
statute's constitutionality . . . ."202 Thus, Governor Daniels implicitly
recognized several principles in his nonsigning statement: (1) that the
legislature is due respect as a coordinate branch; (2) that it is none-
theless appropriate for him to register concerns about the constitu-
tionality of a bill; and (3) that given his level of uncertainty, he could
appropriately allow a default enactment as an alternative to signing or
vetoing the bill.
D. The Significance of the Nonsigning Statement
Having laid the foundation for the appropriateness of the non-
signing statement, it is helpful to examine the political and constitu-
tional significance of its use.
1. A Legislative Tool for the President
First, the nonsigning statement is a significant tool in managing
the President's constitutional role in the legislative process. For exam-
ple, it can afford the President more clear message control about his
position on a bill when he neither approves nor disapproves of it as a
whole. Rather than feeling bound to either sign or veto an entire bill
where he has conflicting views about various provisions, he may simply
acknowledge its passage and state his views in a nonsigning statement.
In this way, the President can withhold approval of a law without the
active disapproval of a veto. While the Constitution directs the Presi-
dent to sign "[i]f he approve [s]," and return the bill "if not," it also
makes the bill law by default if the President does neither.203 The
nonsigning statement properly operates in this interstice together
with the default enactment.
201 See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 94, at 81 n.4 ("I do not believe that the President must
veto every bill that is merely susceptible to an unconstitutional reading, for then he would
be forced to veto every bill.").
202 Daniels, supra note 190.
203 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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A nonsigning statement also affords the President the option to
avoid the embarrassment of a possible veto override. If the President
has concerns about a bill (on constitutional grounds or otherwise) but
expects that Congress will likely override his veto, he can avoid being
overridden while still publicly airing his concerns in a nonsigning
statement. Thus, the President could avoid the political humiliation
of a veto override, while Congress would be saved from the additional
procedural steps involved in such an override. For example, President
Reagan issued a nonsigning statement upon the default enactment of
a labor law that he had strongly opposed204 after Congress passed it
with enough votes to override him. 205 Interestingly, President George
W. Bush sparked the signing statement controversy after signing the
Detainee Treatment Act, which he initially opposed, only after "it be-
came clear that the bill would pass with veto-proof majorities" in Con-
greSS.2 0 6 He might have avoided drawing the same level of criticism if
instead he had allowed a default enactment and stated his views in a
nonsigning statement.
The availability of the nonsigning statement also gives the Presi-
dent an additional political tool in negotiating with Congress. 207 For
example, he might pledge not to sign any bill that contains a certain
provision, which may motivate Congress to make a desired change,
whereas a firm veto threat might risk undermining the bill's political
viability. While members of Congress might table a bill if they are
convinced that the President would veto it, a more modest threat to
not sign the bill might not deter Congress from passing a bill that the
President ultimately favors.
If Congress is concerned about the negative publicity that a con-
stitutional tongue-lashing in a nonsigning statement might generate
and the uncertainty about whether the President might withhold his
signature, it might decide that including the objectionable provisions
are not worth the risk and withdraw them before presentment. Fur-
thermore, a threat to not sign forces Congress to pass controversial or
constitutionally doubtful legislation at least ten days before adjourn-
ment. Otherwise, the nonsigning statement would trigger a pocket
veto rather than a default enactment. 2 08
204 See Ronald Reagan, Statement on the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifica-
tion Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1009 (Aug. 2, 1988).
205 See Alan B. Krueger, Lessons From the Chicago Sit-In, N.Y. TIMEs EcoNoMIx (Dec. 15,
2008, 6:30 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/lessons-from-the-chi-
cago-sit-in/.
206 See Lee, supra note 128, at 718.
207 Cf Barron, supra note 118, at 103 (explaining the benefits of "extra-judicial, inter-
branch negotiation").
208 Cf William P. Barr, Attorney General's Remarks, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
November 15, 1992, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 31, 38-39 (1993) (explaining that signing state-
ments are often issued "as a fall-back position" when it would be "politically impossible" to
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This exchange could strengthen the salutary negotiation process
between the President and Congress about the content of legislation.
Instead of feeling constrained by a binary choice between veto and
signing, the freedom to use a nonsigning statement could encourage
the President to engage Congress more on both policy and constitu-
tional questions. This dynamic would reflect the Constitution's role
for the President in the legislative process, including "recom-
mend[ing] . . . Measures," giving "Congress Information of the State
of the Union,"209 and signing or returning bills that Congress presents
to him.210
2. Consistency with the Constitutional Structure
Issuing a nonsigning statement is also more internally and consti-
tutionally consistent than a signing statement. For instance, it does
not raise the concerns about the inconsistency of "signing-and-de-
nouncing."211 Instead, the nonsigning statement is consistent with
the constitutional scheme of registering a President's dissent in a veto
and approval in a signature. Like a signature, which is the constitu-
tional signal that the President "approve [s]" the bill, and like the "re-
turn" that signals that he "disapprove [s]" of the bill, the nonsigning
statement is an action consistent with the President's position on the
bill-one of doubt, uncertainty, reservations, but acquiescence and
lack of affirmative opposition. Although declining to take a yea-or-nay
position on an entire bill creates some ambiguity about the Presi-
dent's position, that position is clearer than when he at once signs and
denounces a bill. 212
A nonsigning statement also does not give the executive imprima-
tur to a constitutionally questionable bill, thereby avoiding a bad exec-
utive precedent. In other words, a nonsigning statement can help the
President maintain the Executive Branch's integrity by avoiding a his-
tory of giving sanction to constitutionally suspect bills. Doing so dem-
onstrates that the President takes the oath seriously and exercises the
prerogative to interpret the Constitution with care. 213
veto a bill, for example when Congress passes a large spending bill right before
adjournment).
209 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
210 See id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 439 ("[Tihe
Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting
statutes .... ); see also Dellinger Signing Memo, supra note 33, at 135-36 & n.11 ("[T]he
President .. . [is] an important actor in the legislative process . .
211 See supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
212 As discussed below, the President may also pay a different political price for ambi-
guity demonstrated by his decision not to sign. See infta text accompanying notes 223-47.
213 See AMAR, supra note 137, at 63 ("[I]f the president were asked to put his own name
on every proposed bill, his sense of personal honor would prevent him from signing on to
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In addition, withholding the executive imprimatur plausibly posi-
tions the President to decline to defend a questionable provision
upon judicial review. For example, President Bill Clinton might have
issued a nonsigning statement instead of a signing statement when
announcing his concerns about a provision in an omnibus bill that
directed him to discharge HIV-positive military personnel. 214 To ad-
dress his concerns, he worked with Congress to repeal the provision
and planned to decline to defend the provision in court if his lobby-
ing failed. 215 Though Clinton's lobbying succeeded, he might have
more plausibly positioned himself as an opponent of the provision if
he had expressly withheld his signature because of the provision and
offered a nonsigning statement to that effect. Thus, if the controversy
were to reach the Supreme Court, the President could decline to de-
fend the law, consistent with his earlier abstention from signing it.
Furthermore, a nonsigning statement focuses responsibility for
the law on Congress while the President disclaims responsibility. This
disclaimer serves a kind of democracy-reinforcing function 21 6 because
it flags the question for further democratic deliberation in the legisla-
ture.217 Texas Governor Rick Perry recently used a nonsigning state-
ment in precisely this way. Upon deciding to allow the default
enactment of a bill that would raise taxes, he wrote: "While I will allow
Senate Bill No. 575 to become law without my signature, I strongly
urge all relevant elected representatives to fully disclose and explain
the consequences of this legislation to their constituents . . . ."218
Thus, he raised the profile of his policy concerns about a law and
a project that he found to violate his personal pledge to 'preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution.'").
214 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 567, 110 Stat. 186, 328 (1996) (repealed 1996 and codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 1177 (Supp. IV 1998)).
215 SeeJohnsen, supra note 121, at 415-16 ("Instead [of vetoing the bill], he issued a
signing statement to publicly describe his constitutional concerns and declare his inten-
tions: he would work with Congress to repeal the provision before its effective date and if
that failed, he would reluctantly enforce the provision but not defend it in the litigation
that was certain to ensue.").
216 Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87-104 (1980) (advancing a "representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review"); Al-
exander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L.
REv. 40, 63 (1961) ("When the court declares [a] statute void for vagueness, it withholds
adjudication of the substantive issue in order to set in motion the process of legislative
decision.").
217 Cf Fisher, supra note 74, at 210 ("A signing statement has merit in the sense that a
President publicly flags a controversy . . . .");Johnsen, supra note 3, at 1599 ("Executive use
of the avoidance canon, like judicial use, protects constitutional norms by encouraging
Congress to deliberate before coming close to violating them.").
218 See Rick Perry, Statement About SB 575, OFF. GOVERNOR RICK PERRY (June 19, 2009),
http://governor.state.tx.us/news/signature/12642/.
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effectively resubmitted it to the democratic process for further delib-
eration. The same might be done for a law on constitutional grounds.
One might raise an objection along the lines of Professor
Saikrishna Prakash's view that failing to act to protect the Constitution
is just as harmful as affirmatively violating it.219 However, Prakash ex-
plicitly limited his view to cases in which the provision in question was
clearly unconstitutional,220 not reaching the more frequent question
of what to do when Congress presents the President with provisions of
uncertain constitutionality. Here, Professor Amar's research is in-
structive: he notes that neither early practice nor the Constitution's
text or structure required a veto whenever the President believed that
a particular provision of a bill was unconstitutional. 221 Moreover, he
argues that the framers intended that
[i]f the unconstitutional provision of a bill were a mere detail in a
large and critical piece of legislation, a president might properly
choose [a default enactment], just as an individual legislator might
decline to cast a vote in a particular bill or an appellate court might
decline to hear a given discretionary appeal. 222
Considering Amar's comparisons in turn reveals two additional signifi-
cant features of non-signing statements.
First, a President's failure to "cast a vote" on a bill is significant in
that it would likely come at a political cost. 2 2 3 That is, despite avoid-
ing public scrutiny on the choice to sign or veto a bill, the President
may invite a different criticism-the perception that he is waffling
about the bill or generally indecisive on difficult issues. Legislators
are quite familiar with this criticism when they opt to vote "present" or
skip votes. For example, President Barack Obama sustained consider-
able criticism during his presidential campaign for the numerous
"present" votes he cast while serving in the Illinois Senate.224 In addi-
tion to bearing the cost of appearing indecisive, the President also
loses the ability to take credit for provisions in a bill that he does not
sign and subjects himself to attack in political advertisements for not
supporting popular provisions.
Regarding Amar's second comparison, the President's declining
to sign or veto a bill is analogous in some respects to judicial minimal-
ism-deciding only what is necessary to resolve the constitutional
219 See Prakash, supra note 94, at 84.
220 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
221 AMAR, supra note 137, at 183-84 ("Early practice did not go so far as to oblige the
president to veto whenever he deemed any of a bill's provisions unconstitutional.").
222 Id.
223 Thanks to Professor Michael Dorf for suggesting this argument.
224 See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez & Christopher Drew, It's Not Just 'Ayes' and 'Nays':
Obama's Votes in Illinois Echo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at Al.
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question presented. 225 For example, a president might exercise this
"executive minimalism" by not signing a bill in order to withhold judg-
ment on its constitutionality under future factual scenarios, thereby
applying the minimalist doctrine of "ripeness." As Professor Cass Sun-
stein wrote in the context of judicial minimalism, "a judgment that a
complex issue is not ripe for decision may minimize the risk of error
and preserve room for continuing democratic deliberation about the
issue."22 6 Like a court, the President may wish to reserve judgment on
the issue until there is a true controversy about a constitutional viola-
tion rather than declaring a position on its constitutionality before it
has been applied. Until then, flagging the question for further demo-
cratic deliberation may be the more prudent course. 227
Similarly, a president's decision to not sign a bill is somewhat
analogous to a decision by the Supreme Court to deny certiorari. 228
Like the Court, the President would simply decline to render ajudg-
ment on a provision's constitutionality. If the Supreme Court, the
self-styled "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,"229 can decline to
decide a constitutional case without explanation, why cannot the Pres-
ident do the same? Indeed, by issuing a nonsigning statement, the
President would offer much more justification than the typical denial
of certiorari, which contains no explanation at all. In a sense, it might
reflect institutional humility230 on the part of the Executive to not pass
final judgment on the constitutionality of a statute. 231 By abstaining,
the President neither validates nor strikes down the questionable pro-
vision. Nor does he need to invent a pretextual constitutional conflict
in order to justify registering his concerns,232 unlike some signing
225 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996).
226 Id. at 51-52.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 216-18.
228 Cf Bickel, supra note 216, at 57 (arguing that the Supreme Court may prudently
exercise restraint in "withhold[ing] the sanction of constitutionality by the inoffensive ex-
pedient of denying certiorari").
229 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18
(1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion . . .. "). But cf Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REv.
1083, 1153-56 (2009) (contending that while the Supreme Court may be the "ultimate
arbiter" of cases properly before it, some interbranch conflicts are not properly within the
Court's jurisdiction).
230 SeeJohnsen, supra note 121, at 412.
231 Cf Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 589 (1975) ("Decisions not striking down laws do not always mean that
the laws are constitutional, however, for a court's failure to invalidate may only reflect its
institutional limitations.").
232 Cf United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) ("We cannot press statutory con-
struction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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statements that make questionable use of the avoidance canon in or-
der to reconstrue a statute to suit the President.233
Notably, the President's invocation of the principles of judicial
minimalism might carry their attendant drawbacks as well. Consider,
for example, the problem of underenforcing the Constitution. Under
this view, passing Supreme Court muster is merely the lowest common
denominator for constitutionality. 234 The Court's declining to decide
that a provision is unconstitutional because there may be some "ra-
tional basis" for it does not inquire into the actual motivation for its
enactment, nor does it conclude that the provision is constitutional. 235
Perhaps, then, the President should be less deferential than the judici-
ary in assessing Congress's unconstitutional motivations, 236 particu-
larly given his special oath to defend the Constitution.2 3 7  Like a
signing statement, a nonsigning statement could allow a questionable
provision to become law, leaving it "on the books" for possible future
unconstitutional applications that might escape judicial scrutiny.238
Consequently, this analysis casts doubt on Walter Dellinger's posi-
tion 239 that the President should enforce a law if the Supreme Court
would likely uphold it.240
233 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
234 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty ofthe Political Departments, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 365, 382-83 (1998) (reviewing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997)) ("In evaluating the constitutionality of Section 567
[the statute requiring the dismissal of HIV-positive members of the military], the President
applied the basic norm of equal protection without the screens of deference the courts
employ . . . .").
235 See Brest, supra note 231, at 594-96. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Mea-
sure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1212
(1978) ("[A] distinction should be drawn between the extent to which the federal judiciary
may enforce the [constitutional] norm and the extent the norm is otherwise valid and
enforceable.").
236 See Morrison, supra note 42, at 1226 ("[T]he executive branch (through the Presi-
dent) does have an independent responsibility to interpret and implement the Constitu-
tion, [which] . . . may entail enforcing the norm more robustly than the courts would.").
237 The Constitution prescribes the text of a special oath for the President in Article II.
In contrast, Articles I and III contain no special oath requirement for members of Con-
gress and Supreme Court justices, who are subject only to the general requirement in
Article VI to take an oath to "support" the Constitution that applies to all federal and state
officials. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (presidential oath), with U.S. CONsT. arts. I,
III (no oath mentioned), and U.S. CONST. art. VI (general oath for government officials).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
239 See Dellinger Execution Memo, supra note 39, at 200 ("As a general matter, if the
President believes that the Court would sustain a particular provision as constitutional, the
President should execute the statute, notwithstanding his own beliefs about the constitu-
tional issue.").
240 Cf Johnsen, supra note 39, at 58-60 ("[T]he potential inefficacy ofjudicial review
greatly complicate [d] the non-enforcement decision.. . . [The] serious[ness of] the harm
that would result from enforcement . . . weighed heavily in favor of non-enforcement.");
Barron, supra note 118, at 69-70 (explaining that where the Supreme Court declines to
declare a statute unconstitutional, the President might accept the responsibility to make
his own decision about constitutional meaning).
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However, the drawbacks associated with "executive minimalism"
would generally only emerge when the President issues a nonsigning
statement where the factors delineated in Part II indicate that the
oath to defend the Constitution requires a veto. If, however, the Presi-
dent has first determined that he may allow the bill to become law
(whether by signature or default enactment), a nonsigning statement
would be appropriate.
In addition, there may be some value in the President's use of a
nonsigning statement to express concerns about Congress's motiva-
tions but clarify that his own are constitutional. This might have some
bearing on "legislative history" for the courts to consider when inter-
preting the statute or evaluating its constitutionality. This statement,
then, would not purport to bind courts in their statutory construction,
but it may provide some context for courts or bureaucrats to consider.
Unlike a signing statement, which typically comes after the enact-
ment of a law, a nonsigning statement would ordinarily come before
the bill becomes law. Accordingly, proponents of the President's role
in generating legislative history may find some significance in the fact
that a nonsigning statement is a pre-enactment statement of the Presi-
dent. As noted above, the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. City
of New York struck down the "line-item veto" in part because it
amounted to a postenactment repeal. 241 However, the President's
weighing in on a bill before its enactment is an exercise of the Presi-
dent's legislative powers under Articles I and II of the Constitution. 242
3. Institutionalizing the Nonsigning Statement
Beyond the differences between nonsigning statements and sign-
ing statements in particular circumstances, institutionalizing the use
of nonsigning statements might reveal additional significant differ-
ences between the two practices. Public understanding that the non-
signing statement is a serious option may alter expectations about
presidential treatment of bills.
A potential benefit of institutionalizing the nonsigning statement
is that, unlike the signing statement,243 presidents would be unlikely
to use it to stake out unduly broad positions of authority. Because the
decision not to sign a bill is a serious one that likely imposes greater
costs2 44 on the President than issuing a signing statement, he is un-
likely to take that decision lightly or to use it as a routine method for
making sweeping claims of executive power. On the one hand, when
a claim of expansive power comes at no cost to the President (as in a
241 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
242 See supra text accompanying note 210.
243 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.c.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 223-47.
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signing statement), the President is likely to make the claim as a rou-
tine matter. On the other hand, because the President must sustain a
political cost by issuing a nonsigning statement, he is unlikely to use
such statements routinely as vehicles to make expansive claims of
power. Instead, the President is likely to only use such statements
when making an expansive power claim is worth the cost of doing so.
Consequently, unlike the controversial Bush signing statements dis-
cussed above,245 nonsigning statements would likely not take the form
of ritualistic invocations of boilerplate language.
While a president might view the nonsigning statement's costs as
drawbacks to its use, such drawbacks operate as an inherent "limiting
principle" that is absent from the signing statement.246 Due to the
nonsigning statement's different political consequences, it reinforces
accountability consistent with the Constitution's structure of imposing
checks and balances on the powers of each branch of government.
Thus, institutionalizing the use of nonsigning statements would add
new considerations of constitutionality and accountability for the Pres-
ident when presented with a bill.
Presumably, the President's willingness to incur political costs
would signal serious concern about a bill, which would command at-
tention from Congress and the public. However, if the President
makes a smart political calculation, the political costs may be offset
with the benefits associated with avoiding voter criticism over signing
an unconstitutional bill24 7 and with publicly demonstrating constitu-
tional conscientiousness.
Institutionalizing the nonsigning statement might also affect con-
gressional behavior. For example, Congress might adjust provisions
in bills in order to elicit the President's signature instead of a default
enactment. Members of Congress might consider it important to have
the full support of the Executive behind a new law instead of the resis-
tance of a nonsigning statement. Therefore, as discussed above, Con-
gress might have a greater incentive to negotiate with the President
and tailor legislation to comport with his views. 248
In some cases, Congress might have a political motive to eliminate
the President's option to allow default enactment. For example, if
Congress had a strong, veto-proof majority in favor of a bill, it might
want to force the President to either sign the bill or veto it. If the
President signs the bill (the reasoning might go), it demonstrates
presidential approval, and Congress wins a victory. If the President
245 See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
247 Cf Hernandez & Drew, supra note 224 (explaining that a vote of "present" may give
legislators political cover when they oppose some, but not all, provisions of a bill).
248 See supra text accompanying notes 207-10.
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vetoes it, the President becomes subject to political criticism and the
shame of a probable veto override.
To remove the President's default enactment option would re-
quire considerable procedural maneuvering. 249 To do so, Congress
could threaten to adjourn if the President did not sign the bill within
nine days. If the President did not sign and Congress followed
through on its threat, the President's intended default enactment
would convert into a pocket veto because "the Congress by their Ad-
journment" would have "prevent[ed the bill's] Return."2 5 0 Thus, the
President would be stripped of the ability to allow a default
enactment.
Of course, this would be an extreme measure for Congress to
take simply to score a political victory, and it would require putting
other legislative business on hold. Moreover, as discussed above,
there remains some uncertainty about just what kind of adjournment
is sufficient to effect a pocket veto. 251 To be safe, Congress would
likely need to adjourn for a substantial length of time to avoid a subse-
quent judicial finding that it was merely a brief intrasession recess. 252
Interestingly, it is precisely this scenario that has encouraged
presidents to use signing statements.253 When the costs of allowing a
bill to fail are too great, but when the President cannot return it to
Congress for revisions because it has adjourned, the President may
feel that the only option for registering concerns is a signing state-
ment. This scenario of an imminent congressional adjournment is
unique because it is the only time when the nonsigning statement is
unavailable.
In a recent example, President Obama faced a quandary when,
on the very day of the 111th Congress's adjournment, 254 it passed a
massive defense spending bill that included a provision restricting the
Executive's ability to transfer prisoners out of Guantinamo for trial in
the United States.25 5 Had Obama not signed the bill, he would have
249 It is unlikely that Congress could constitutionally write a provision into a bill that
required the President's signature for its enactment (for example, by making it expire
unless signed). Given the Supreme Court's decisions in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), it appears that Congress may not
modify the Constitution's procedure for enacting laws (except, of course, by constitutional
amendment). See discussion supra Part I.A.
250 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
251 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
252 See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a brief
intrasession recess did not "prevent" the return of a bill).
253 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
254 See H.R. Con. Res. 336, 111th Cong. (2010) (agreeing to adjourn on December 22,
2010).
255 See H.R. 6523, 111th Cong. § 1032 (2010). Though passed on December 22, the
bill was not formally presented to the President until December 29. See Bill Summary &
Status, LIBR. CONGRESS (an. 7, 2011), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d11l:HR
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effected a pocket veto because "Congress by their Adjournment pre-
vent[ed] its Return"256 before the ten-day period for his consideration
had elapsed. Consequently, Congress had (perhaps unknowingly)
locked him into the rare sign-or-pocket-veto scenario, stripping him of
the ability to allow a default enactment. Thus, despite Obama's
"strong objection" to the Guantainamo provision, he signed the bill
"because of the importance of . .. military activities in 2011.1"257 Had
Congress passed the bill just days earlier, it may have been an ideal
opportunity for Obama to issue a nonsigning statement registering his
concerns. Instead, having signed the bill, he appears to have assumed
responsibility for the very provision he concurrently denounced as "a
dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch
authority."25
CONCLUSION
In the ongoing debate about presidential signing statements,
commentators have narrowly focused on the dichotomy between the
President's options to sign or veto a bill, while ignoring the option to
allow the bill to become law unsigned-by default enactment. Non-
signing statements are more constitutionally consistent than signing
statements, militate against overbroad claims of power, and give the
President political tools that encourage engagement with Congress on
policy.
Before deciding whether to issue a nonsigning statement, the
President must first answer the threshold question of whether the bill
contains the kind of constitutional violation that the presidential oath
requires him to veto. In making this determination, the President
should consider how severe the violation is and how central the provi-
sion is to the bill's legislative scheme. In evaluating the severity of the
violation, the President should consider how clear the violation is, to
what extent it infringes on executive authority, and whether Congress
made a judgment on the provision's constitutionality. In evaluating
the provision's centrality to the bill, the President should consider
how important the questionable provision is with respect to the whole
bill and may also consider the urgency and necessity of enacting the
bill.
Once the President determines that a veto is not required, the
President may decide how to register concerns, if any, that he has
06523:@@@X. Thus, the President's deadline for signature-ten days after presentment,
Sundays excepted-was January 10, 2011.
256 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
257 Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2011, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011).
258 Id.
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about the bill. Recent commentary has hotly debated the constitu-
tionality of issuing a signing statement to express concerns about a bill
that the President has just approved. This Note proposes that the
President should consider issuing a nonsigning statement instead of a
signing statement in cases where the President's concerns about a bill
are significant but do not require an outright veto.
Issuing a nonsigning statement may operate as a political tool for
the President, but it also comes at an appropriate political cost that
would likely prevent its abuse. On the one hand, the President can
use a potential signature as a bargaining chip with Congress without
being cornered into a veto as the only alternative. This option allows
the President to avoid the embarrassment of a possible veto override
while maintaining his integrity by refusing to approve a bill about
which he has constitutional doubts. On the other hand, the President
pays a political price for appearing indecisive in exchange for these
benefits. As a result, he is unlikely to overuse the nonsigning state-
ment to make routine, vague, or sweeping claims of power.
In addition, by declining to pass judgment on a bill of uncertain
constitutionality, the President shows deference to one coordinate
branch (Congress) while following the minimalist interpretive ap-
proach of the other (the Judiciary). Of course, the President should
not invoke this minimalist approach after determining (based on his
application of the factors listed above) that the presidential oath re-
quires a veto. In other words, too much deference and too much
minimalism may each have their own deleterious constitutional
effects.
In short, a nonsigning statement is a viable and often superior
alternative to a signing statement that merits the President's serious
consideration. While a nonsigning statement is rarely unavailable due
to Congress's adjournment, issuing one when possible may avoid
drawing the intense criticism recently focused on the signing state-
ment. Moreover, it provides the President with political tools consis-
tent with the constitutional structure for the enactment of laws.
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